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ABSTRACT
Federated learning has received significant interests recently due
to its capability of learning a shared machine learning model across
smart devices without accessing their private data in the era of
Internet of things. This paper jointly considers two critical issues
of federated learning – data privacy and communication efficiency
– and develops a communication-efficient and differentially-private
federated learning scheme called CPFed. The main challenge in ad-
dressing both issues together lies in the fact that data compression
techniques often lead to an increased number of training itera-
tions required for achieving some desired training loss due to the
compression errors, while the differential privacy guarantee usu-
ally deteriorates with respect to the number of training iterations.
To reconcile this dilemma, we propose to use sparsified privacy-
masking that first adds random noise to the model update and then
applies unbiased random sparsifier before uploading the model
update at each device in federated learning. By using sparsified
privacy-masking, our proposed CPFed scheme can achieve high
communication efficiency and strong data privacy guarantee at the
same time while preserving model accuracy. We provide an explict
end-to-end privacy guarantee of CPFed using zero-concentrated dif-
ferential privacy and give its theoretical convergence rates for both
convex and non-convex models. Through extensive numerical ex-
periments on real-world datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness
and efficiency of our proposed method.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Machine learning; • Theory
of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms; • Se-
curity and privacy;
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the development of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies,
smart devices with built-in sensors, Internet connectivity, and pro-
grammable computation capability have proliferated and generated
huge volumes of data at the network edge over the past few years.
These data can be collected and analyzed to build machine learning
models that enable a wide range of intelligent services, such as
personal fitness tracking [29], traffic monitoring [16], smart home
security [40], and renewable energy integration [14]. However, data
are often sensitive in many services, like the heart rate monitored
by smart watches, and can leak a lot of personal information about
the users. Due to the privacy concern, users would not be willing
to share their data, prohibiting the deployment of these intelligent
services. Federated Learning is a novel machine learning paradigm
where a group of edge devices collaboratively learn a shared model
under the orchestration of a central server without sharing their
training data. It mitigates many of the privacy risks resulting from
the traditional, centralized machine learning paradigm, and has
received significant attention recently [25].
Although promising, federated learning faces several challenges,
among which communication overhead is a major one[21]. Specif-
ically, at each iteration of federated learning, edge devices first
download the shared model from the server and compute updates
to it using their own datasets, and then these updates will be gath-
ered by the server to renew the shared model. Although only model
updates are transmitted between edge devices and the server instead
of the raw data, such updates could contain hundreds of millions
of parameters for modern machine learning models such as deep
neural networks, resulting in high bandwidth usage per iteration.
Moreover, federated learning requires many iterations to achieve a
high model accuracy, and hence the communication of the whole
training process is expensive. Since most edge devices are resource-
constrained, the bandwidth between the server and edge devices is
rather limited, especially during up-link transmissions. Therefore,
it is crucial to make federated learning communication-efficient.
Besides communication efficiency, privacy leakage is another
core challenge in federated learning[21]. Although in federated
learning edge devices keep their data locally and only exchange
ephemeral model updates which contain less information than raw
data, this is not sufficient to guarantee data privacy. For example,
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by observing the model updates from an edge device, it is possi-
ble for the adversary to recover the private dataset in that device
using model inversion attack [15] or infer whether a sample is in
the dataset of that device using membership inference attack [32].
Therefore, how to protect against those advanced privacy attacks
and provide strong privacy guarantee for each participant in fed-
erated learning without a fully trusted server is challenging and
needs to be addressed.
In order to motivate and retain edge devices in federated learn-
ing, it is desirable to achieve both communication efficiency and
data privacy guarantee. Most of the existing work focus on either
communication efficiency [4, 18, 37, 38] or data privacy [7, 31] in
the federated learning or general distributed learning settings. For
the limited amount of work that consider both [2, 11, 42], they
are either restricted to the distributed (stochastic) gradient descent
framework, therefore not suitable to the federated learning setting
due to its large number of communication rounds [25], or having
high implementation cost and unsatisfactory performance. The
main challenge in addressing both differential privacy and com-
munication efficiency together in federated learning is that data
compression techniques often lead to an increased number of train-
ing iterations required for achieving some desired training loss
due to the compression errors, while the privacy guarantee usually
deteriorates with respect to the number of training iterations.
In this paper, we propose a novel federated learning scheme
called Communication-efficient and Privacy-preserving Federated
learning (CPFed) that both reduces communication cost and pro-
vides differential privacy guarantee without assuming a trusted
server. The proposed scheme is designed based on the FedAvg
framework [25], the current state-of-the-art method for federated
learning, to ensure practical relevance and easy implementation.
However, to reconcile the dilemma between communication ef-
ficiency and privacy protection, CPFed uses sparsified privacy-
masking that first adds random noise to the model update and then
applies unbiased random sparsifier before uploading the model
update at each device in federated learning. By using sparsified
privacy-masking, our method can greatly improve the communi-
cation efficiency and privacy guarantee while preserving model
accuracy.
In summary, themain contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows.
• We propose a new federated learning scheme called CPFed,
which is both communication-efficient and differentially pri-
vate for learning over distributed data without a trusted
central server. The proposed scheme makes only lightweight
modifications to FedAvg, the current state-of-the-art method
for federated learning without strong trust assumptions,
which enables easy integration of CPFed into existing pack-
ages/systems.
• To improve communication efficiency and privacy of fed-
erated learning simultaneously, we develop the sparsified
privacy masking technique which first adds Gaussian noise
to the model update and then applies the unbiased random
sparsifier before uploading the model update to the central
server in federated learning. We show that with sparsified
privacy masking, our proposed CPFed can achieve stronger
privacy guarantee and higher communication efficiency at
the same time.
• We show that with properly selected parameters, our CPFed
algorithm is (ϵ,δ )-differential private and has a convergence
rate of O( 1T τ ) for both convex and non-convex loss func-
tions, whereT is the total number of communication rounds
and τ is the local iteration period. Moreover, we study
accuracy-privacy trade-off. For the convex loss function,
CPFed achieves a convergence rate of O(p√log(1/δ )/√ϵ +
log(1/δ )/pϵ), where p is the probability of sparsification. For
the non-convex loss function, CPFed achieves a convergence
rate of O((1/p + p)√log(1/δ )/ϵ).
• We evaluate the performance of our approach on real-world
datasets extensively with both convex and non-convex learn-
ing models. The experiments show that the proposed CPFed
can largely improve both the communication efficiency and
model accuracy compared to the state-of-the-art federated
learning scheme with differential privacy under the same
privacy guarantee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries on
privacy notations used in this paper are described in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces the system setting and problem formulation.
Section 4 presents the proposed CPFed scheme. The privacy guar-
antee and convergence properties of CPFed are rigorously analyzed
in Section 5. Section 6 shows the experimental results, and Section 7
reviews the related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In what follows, we briefly describe the basics of differential privacy
(DP) and their properties. DP is a rigorous notion of privacy and
has become the de-facto standard for measuring privacy risk. The
classic notion of DP is (ϵ,δ )-DP [13], defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 ((ϵ,δ )-DP). Given privacy parameters ϵ > 0, 0 ≤
δ ≤ 1, a randomized mechanism (algorithm)M satisfies (ϵ,δ )-DP
if for any two adjacent datasets D,D ′ that differ in at most one data
sample and any subset of outputs S ⊆ range(M),
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ Pr[M(D ′) ∈ S ] + δ . (1)
There are several relaxations of (ϵ,δ )-DP, such as the zero-
concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) and Rényi differential
privacy. In this paper, we will use zCDP. As a relaxed version of
(ϵ,δ )-DP, ρ-zCDP has a tight composition bound and is more suit-
able to analyze the end-to-end privacy loss of iterative algorithms.
To define zCDP, we first define the privacy loss. Given any subset
of outputs S ⊆ range(M), the privacy loss Z of the mechanismM
is a random variable defined as:
Z := log Pr[M(D) = S]Pr[M(D ′) = S] . (2)
zCDP imposes a bound on the moment generating function of the
privacy loss Z . Formally, a randomized mechanism M satisfies
ρ-zCDP if for any two adjacent datasets D,D ′, it holds that for all
α ∈ (1,∞),
E[e(α−1)Z ] ≤ e(α−1)ρ . (3)
Here, (3) requires the privacy loss Z to be concentrated around
zero, and hence it is unlikely to distinguish D from D ′ given their
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Figure 1: System architecture of federated learning.
outputs. One method to achieve zCDP is through the Gaussian
mechanism [9]: when a query q(D) is taken over the dataset, the
Gaussian mechanism adds a Gaussian noise b ∼ N(0,σ 21d ) to
perturb the query result and release perturbed result.
Lemma 2.2 (Gaussian Mechanism). Let D ∼ Dm be a dataset
collected fromm individuals from an unknown population distribution
D and q : Dm → Rd be a vector-valued function over datasets. Let
M be the mechanism releasing q(D)+ b where b ∼ N(0,σ 21d ), then
for any two adjacent datasets D,D ′ and any α ∈ (1,+∞),M satisfies
∆22(q)/(2σ 2)-zCDP, where ∆2(q) is the L2 sensitivity of q defined by
∆2(q) = supD,D′ ∥q(D) − q(D ′)∥2.
Similar to (ϵ,δ )-DP, zCDP has the following properties [9]:
Lemma 2.3 (zCDP composition). Suppose two mechanisms sat-
isfy ρ1-zCDP and ρ2-zCDP, then their composition satisfies ρ1 + ρ2-
zCDP.
Lemma 2.4 (zCDP to (ϵ,δ )-DP). IfM is a mechanism that pro-
vides ρ-zCDP, thenM is (ρ + 2√ρ log(1/δ ),δ )-DP for any δ > 0.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1 Federated Learning System
Consider a federated learning system that consists of a central
server and n clients/devices as depicted in Figure 1. Each client i
has a local datasetDi = {x i1, . . . ,x im }, representing a collection ofm
datapoints. The clients want to collaboratively learn a shared model
θ ∈ Rd using their collective datasets under the orchestration of
the central server. Due to the privacy concern and high latency
of uploading all local datapoints to the server, federated learning
allows clients to train the model while keeping their data locally.
Specifically, the shared model θ is learned by minimizing the overall
empirical risk of the loss on the union of all local datasets, that is,
min
θ
f (θ ) := 1
n
n∑
i=1
fi (θ ) with fi (θ ) := 1
m
∑
x ∈Di
l(θ ,x). (4)
Here, fi represents the local objective function of client i , l(θ ;x) is
the loss of the model θ ∈ Rd at a datapoint x sampled from local
dataset Di .
The state-of-the-art approach to solve (4) in the federated learn-
ing setting is the federated averaging (FedAvg) algorithm [25]. In
FedAvg, at the beginning of each communication round, each par-
ticipating client i first downloads the most recent shared model θ
from the server and locally updates the modelθ by runningmultiple
mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) steps using its local
dataset. Then, each client uploads its updated model θi to the server,
where the received local models from all clients are aggregated to
update the shared model θ . This procedure repeats until certain
convergence criteria are satisfied. FedAvg has shown promising
empirical results and been deployed in practice by Google [6].
3.2 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary here can be the “honest-but-curious”
central server or clients in the system. The central server will hon-
estly follow the designed training protocol, but are curious about
the client’s private data and may infer it from the shared messages.
Furthermore, some clients could collude with the central server or
each other to infer private information about a specific client. Be-
sides, the adversary can also be the passive outside attacker. These
attackers can eavesdrop all shared messages in the execution of the
training protocol but will not actively inject false messages into
or interrupt the message transmission. Malicious clients who, for
instance, may launch data pollution attacks by lying about their
private datasets or returning incorrect computed results to disrupt
the training process are out of the scope of this paper and will be
left as our future work.
4 CPFed: A SPARSIFIED PRIVACY-MASKING
APPROACH
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Figure 2: Illustration ofCPFed for τ = 4 and r = 3. Blue, black,
red arrows represent gradient computation, model upload-
ing, and model aggregation, respectively.
In this section, we develop a new federated learning scheme
called CPFed to solve the empirical riskminimization problem (4) on
the basis of FedAvg. CPFed is designed to reduce the communication
cost and privacy loss in federated learning simultaneously without
much degradation on the model accuracy. In CPFed, the server
collects the sparsified noisy model updates from the selected clients
and updates the shared model iteratively at each round.
Figure 2 illustrates the process of CPFed. Let T be the total num-
ber of communication rounds and τ the local iteration period. De-
note by t = {0, . . . ,T − 1} and s = {0, . . . ,τ − 1} the index of
communication round and local iteration, respectively. At round t ,
the server selects a subset of r clients Ωt and sends them the latest
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shared model θ t to perform local update. Let θ t,si represent the
local model of client i at local iteration s of round t . To compute
the local updates, each selected client i ∈ Ωt initializes its local
model using the downloaded shared model, i.e., θ t,si = θ
t when
s = 0. Then, the client updates its local model for τ iterations by
θ t,s+1i = θ
t,s
i − η∇fi (θ t,si , ξ t,si ). (5)
Here, η is the stepsize, and ∇fi (θ t,si , ξ t,si ) :=
1/B∑x ∈ξ t,si ∇l(θ t,si ,x) represents the gradient of fi based
on a subset of B datapoints ξ t,si sampled from the dataset Di . After
τ local iterations, each selected client computes its local update, i.e.,
the difference between the current local model and the downloaded
shared model, and sends the update to the server.
Since the local model update contains private information of the
client’s data, each client first randomly perturbs their computed
local model update before sharing it with the server. Specifically,
after τ local iterations, each selected client computes its local update
and perturbs the result by
∆ti = θ
t,τ
i − θ t + bti , (6)
where bti is the Gaussian noise sampled at round t from the distri-
bution N(0,σ 21d ).
To save the communication cost incurred at each communication
round, we utilize the sparsification, which is a commonly used com-
pression technique for communication-efficient distributed learn-
ing algorithms, to compress the messages transmitted from clients
to the server. The key idea of a sparsifier is to sparsify a high-
dimensional vector by randomly selecting some coordinates and
setting the information of these coordinates to zero. In this paper,
we adopt the Bernoulli randomized sparsifier defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Sparsifier [35]). For any constant p ∈ (0, 1) and
vector y = [y1, . . . ,yd ]T ∈ Rd , Sp (y) outputs a sparse vector with
the j-th element [Sp (y)]j following the distribution:{
P([Sp (y)]j = yjp ) = p,
P([Sp (y)]j = 0) = 1 − p.
It follows immediately from Definition 4.1 that the sparsifier has
a bounded variance, which is given below:
Lemma 4.2 (Unbiased and Bounded Sparsifier). For any con-
stant p ∈ (0, 1) and vector y ∈ Rd , Sp (y) satisfies: 1) E[Sp (y)] = y;
and 2) Var[Sp (y)] = (1/p − 1)∥y∥2.
To save the communication cost per round, the most intuitive
way is to apply the sparsifier on ∆ti . However, the additional noise
introduced by the sparsifier will slow down the convergence, which
means that more communication rounds are required to achieve
the same accuracy guarantee [35]. Consequently, the privacy loss
increases as more communications are involved. Therefore, instead
of sparsifying ∆ti directly, we first apply an error compensation
on ∆ti . Specifically, each client keeps a memory r
t
i ∈ Rd about the
past information, i.e., the information that has not been sent out
in the past round. Before sharing information with the server, the
selected client i compensates its local update by
∆˜ti = ∆
t
i + r
t
i , (7)
and perturbs the local update by adding Gaussian noise as in (6).
Then, the client obtains the sparsified noisy local update ∆¯ti =
Sp (∆˜ti ) and sends it to the server where all of the sparsified noisy
local updates will be aggregated to update the shared model:
θ t+1 =
1
r
∑
i ∈Ωt
∆¯ti . (8)
After the selected clients sent out their messages, they update the
error memories as follows:
r t+1i = r
t
i + ∆
t
i − p∆¯ti , (9)
which is used to track the error of the current round. The overall
scheme of CPFed is summarized in Algorithm 1.
It is worth noting that, although sparsification is a randomized
mechanism and reduces the information to be transmitted, it does
not provide any privacy guarantee in terms of DP. However, we
will show that the sparsifier does help to provide better privacy
guarantee for clients in our proposed scheme.
Algorithm 1 CPFed
Input: T , τ , r , η, p, σ , θ0, and r0i = 0,∀i ∈ [n]
1: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
2: Server uniformly selects r clients denoted by Ωt ;
3: Server broadcasts θ t to all clients in Ωt ;
4: for all clients i in Ωt in parallel do
5: θ t,0i ← θ t ;
6: for s = 0 to τ − 1 do
7: Randomly sample a mini-batch of datapoints ξ t,si from
Di ;
8: θ t,s+1i ← θ t,si − η∇fi (θ t,si , ξ t,si );
9: end for
10: ∆ti ← θ t,τi − θ t + bti where bti ∼ N(0,σ 21d );
11: ∆˜ti ← ∆ti + r ti ;
12: ∆¯ti ← Sp (∆˜ti ) and send it to the server;
13: r t+1i ← r ti + ∆ti − p∆¯ti
14: end for
15: Server updates θ t+1 ← θ t + 1r
∑
i ∈Ωt ∆¯ti .
16: end for
5 MAIN THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the privacy and convergence properties
of the proposed CPFed method. Before stating our results, we make
the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Smoothness). The loss function l is L-smooth,
i.e., for any i ∈ [n] and x, y ∈ Rd , we have l(y) ≤ l(x) + ⟨∇l(x), y −
x⟩ + L2 ∥y − x∥2.
Assumption 2 (Bounded variance). Let ξi be a subset of data-
points sampled from client i’s dataset uniformly at random. The local
stochastic gradient is unbiased and will not diverge a lot from the exact
local gradient, i.e., for any x ∈ Rd and i ∈ [n], E[∇fi (x, ξi )] = ∇fi (x)
and E
[∥∇fi (x, ξi ) − ∇fi (x)∥2] ≤ ω.
Assumption 3 (Bounded Coordinate-wise Gradient). Each
coordinate of ∇l(x) is uniformly bounded, i.e., for any x ∈ Rd and
any j ∈ [d], E∥[∇l(x)]j ∥2 ≤ G/
√
d .
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Assumption 1 is standard and also implies that the local loss
functions f1, . . . , fn and global loss function f are L-smooth. As-
sumption 2 is common in federated learning and also made in
previous work [24, 33, 41]. Assumption 3 characterizes the sensi-
tivity of each coordinate of x and implies ∥∇l(x)∥2 ≤ G , which can
be enforced by the gradient clipping technique [1] commonly used
in machine learning.
5.1 Privacy Analysis
In this subsection, we provide the end-to-end privacy analysis of
CPFed based on zCDP, which can tightly account for the total loss
after composition, and then convert it to the traditional (ϵ,δ )-DP
guarantee. Due to the use of sparsification, each coordinate of the
perturbed local update ∆˜ti will be set as zero with probability 1 − p.
Let ωj (∆˜ti ) = 1 if [∆˜ti ]j is set to zero, otherwise ωj (∆˜ti ) = 0. We use
Ci,t = {j : ωj (∆˜ti ) = 0} to denote the active set of ∆˜ti , which means
all the coordinates of ∆˜ti indexed by Ci,t will be divided by p and
shared with the server. Then, we can rewrite the sparsified local
update as:
[∆˜ti ]Ci,t = [θ t,τi − θ t + r ti + bti ]Ci,t /p
= ([θ t,τi − θ t + r ti ]Ci,t + [bti ]Ci,t )/p.
Therefore, we need to analyze the privacy guarantee of the above
local update. Basically, we need to compute the sensitivity of [θ t,τi −
θ t + r ti ]Ci,t and analyze the privacy loss after adding the noise
[bti ]Ci,t . Based on Assumptions 1–3, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. At round t , for any i ∈ Ωt , the sensitivity of [θ t,τi −
θ t + r ti ]Ci,t is bounded by 2τG
√|Ci,t |/B√d .
Proof. For client i , given any two neighboring datasets Di and
D ′i that differ only in one data sample, let ∆Ci,t denote the sensitiv-
ity of [θ t,τi − θ t + r ti ]Ci,t , then the square of ∆Ci,t is
∆2Ci,t =
[θ t,τi (Di ) − θ t + r ti ]Ci,t − [θ t,τi (D ′i ) − θ t + r ti ]Ci,t 2
=
[θ t,τi (Di ) − θ t,τi (D ′i )]Ci,t 2
=
τ−1∑
s=0
η
[
∇fi (θ t,si ; ξ t,si ) − ∇fi (θ t,si ; ξ t,si
′)
]
Ci,t
2
≤ τ
τ−1∑
s=0
[∇fi (θ t,si ; ξ t,si ) − ∇fi (θ t,si ; ξ t,si ′)]Ci,t
2
=
τ
B2
τ−1∑
s=0


∑
x ∈ξ t,si
∇l(θ t,si ;x) −
∑
x ′∈ξ t,si
′
∇l(θ t,si ;x ′)
Ci,t

2
=
τ
B2
τ−1∑
s=0
[∇l(θ t,si ;x) − ∇l(θ t,si ;x ′)]Ci,t 2 ,
where the inequality uses the fact that the client uses a mini-batch
ofDi to compute the gradient and that ∥∑ni=1 ai ∥2 ≤ n∑ni=1 ∥ai ∥2,
and the last equation comes from the fact that ξ t,si and ξ
t,s
i
′ differ
at most in one data sample. Assume Assumption 3 holds, we have
∆Ci,t =
2τG
√|Ci,t |
B
√
d
.
□
Then using Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 2.2, we obtain the following
result:
Lemma 5.2 (Privacy Loss Per round). Each round of Algorithm 1
provides 2τ 2G2 |Ci,t |/B2dσ 2-zCDP guarantee for client i ∈ Ωt .
Due to the random client selection in each round, not all clients
will upload their models to the server at round t . If their models
are not sent out, they do not consume their privacy budget at
that round. Indeed, every client in the system only participates
in the training with probability r/n at each round. Therefore, by
Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.4 and Lemma 5.2, we can obtain the end-to-
end privacy guarantee for each client in the system as given in
Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.3. If the Gaussian noise bti in Algorithm 1 is sampled
from N(0,σ 21d ), then Algorithm 1 achieves (ϵ,δ )-DP for each client
in the system after T rounds of training, where
ϵ = ρ + 2
√
ρ log 1
δ
with ρ =
2rτ 2G2
∑T−1
t=0 |Ci,t |
nB2dσ 2
. (10)
According to our threat model described in Section 3.2, clients
and the server in the system are “honest-but-curious”, and attack-
ers outside the system can only eavesdrop the transmitted mes-
sages. The transmitted message can be the latest shared model
and the local updates, both of which contain private information
of clients’ training data. By Theorem 5.3, the local update ∆ti pre-
serves (ϵ,δ )-DP for each client and prevents the privacy leakage
from the server, which is proportional to the size of noise σ . Due
to the post-processing property of DP[13], any further processing
on ∆ti will not incur additional privacy loss. Therefore, the shared
model θ t+1 updated based on ∆ti also preserves the same level of
DP guarantee for each client in CPFed.
5.2 Convergence Analysis
In this subsection, we present the convergence properties of CPFed
for convex and non-convex loss functions. To analyze the conver-
gence rate of CPFed, we first summarize the update rule of CPFed
in a general manner. In Algorithm 1, the total number of iterations
is K , i.e., K = Tτ . At iteration k where k = tτ + s , each client i com-
putes the stochastic gradient ∇fi (θki , ξki ) based on its local dataset
to update its local model θki . Thus, n clients will have different local
models {θk1 , . . . ,θkn }. Assume that Ωt contains a subset of r indices
uniformly sampled from the set of clients [n] without replacement.
Let Ωk = Ωt , rki = r
t
i and b
k
i = b
t
i when k + 1 mod τ = 0. The
update rule of CPFed can be rewritten as follows: at iteration k ,
client i in Ωk updates its local model θki by
θk+1i =
{
θki − η∇fi (θki , ξki ), if k + 1 mod τ , 0
θk−τ+1i +
1
r
∑
i ∈Ωk Sp (∆˜ki ), o.w.
,
where ∆˜ki = θ
k
i − η∇fi (θki , ξki ) − θk−τ+1i + rki + bki .
In our analysis, we define several virtual sequences as fol-
lows: θˆk = 1/r ∑i ∈Ωk θki , дˆk = 1/r ∑i ∈Ωk ∇fi (θki , ξki ), rˆk =
1/r ∑i ∈Ωk rki and bˆk = 1/r ∑i ∈Ωk bki . Therefore, we have that
when k + 1 mod τ , 0, θˆk+1 = θˆk −ηдˆk . When k + 1 mod τ = 0,
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θˆk+1 = θˆk0 + Sp (θˆk − ηдˆk − θˆk0 + rˆk + bˆk ) where k0 = k − τ + 1.
In what follows, we provide some important properties of these
virtual sequences. The related proofs are given in Appendix.
Lemma 5.4 (Unbiased Client Selection). Assume that Ωk con-
tains a subset of r indices uniformly sampled from [n] without re-
placement, then we have
EΩk [θˆk ] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
θki , (11)
Var[θˆk ] = n
r (n − 1)
(
1 − r
n
)
τ 2η2G/m. (12)
Lemma 5.5 (Bounding Stochastic Gradient). Assume As-
sumption 2 and 3 holds. The expectation and variance of дˆk are
E[дˆk ] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki ), (13)
Var[дˆk ] ≤ ω
r
+
2G
m
(
1
r
− 1
n
)
. (14)
Lemma 5.6 (Bounding Gaussian Noise). The expectation of the
square norm of bˆk is
E∥bˆk ∥2 = d
r
σ 2. (15)
Lemma 5.7 (Bounding the divergence of {θki }). Assume As-
sumption 3 holds, then we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
∥θ¯k − θki ∥2 ≤ τ 2η2G/B. (16)
Lemma 5.8 (Bounding Error Memory). The square norm of the
error memory rk+1 is bounded by
E∥rˆk+1∥2 ≤ η
2τ 2G
rB
(
1 + 1
p
)
1
2p2 − 1 +
2d(1 − p)σ 2
r
. (17)
5.2.1 Convergence Result: Convex Loss. This subsection describes
the convergence rate of CPFed for smooth and strongly convex loss
functions. We first describe Assumption 4, which implies that the
local loss functions fi ,∀i ∈ [n] and the global loss function f are
also µ-strongly convex.
Assumption 4. The loss function l is µ-strongly convex if for any
x, y ∈ Rd we have ∥∇l(x) − ∇l(y)∥ ≥ µ∥x − y∥ for some µ > 0.
Convergence Criteria. In the convergence rate analysis of
CPFed for convex loss functions, we use the expected optimal-
ity gap as the convergence criteria, i.e., afterT rounds, Algorithm 1
is said to achieve an expected γ -suboptimal solution if
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
t=0
f (θˆk+1) − f ∗
]
≤ γ , (18)
where γ is an arbitrarily small value and f ∗ is the objective value
at the optimal solution θ∗. Specifically, we have the following main
convergence results:
Theorem 5.9 (Convergence Rate for Convex Losses). For
the CPFed algorithm, suppose the total number of iterations K = Tτ
where T is the number of communication round and τ is the round
length. Under Assumptions 1-4, assume all clients are initialized at the
same point θ0 ∈ Rd . Then after K iterations, the expected optimality
gap is bounded as follows:
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
f (θˆk+1) − f ∗
]
≤ 1 − ηµ
Kηµ
(
f (θ0) − f ∗
)
+H (n
r
− 1)+C
+O(1 − p) +Q(p,σ 2). (19)
whereH (nr −1) = ( τ
2η3GL2
2m(n−1) +
η2Lω
2n )(nr −1)+ η
2LG
2mn ( 2nr −1),O(1−p) =
η2τG(p+1)
2r Bp(2p2−1) +
2η2τ LG(1−p)
r Bp +
2η2τ LG
rB
1
p2(2p2−1) ,Q(p,σ 2) = dσ
2
τ r (2p+
2
p +
1
L ), andC =
τ 2η3GL2
2m(n−1)B +
η2Lω
2n +
(2−η2L)G
τnm . Here,G is the variance
bound of coordinate-wise stochastic gradients, σ 2 is the variance of
Gaussian noise, L is the Lipschitz constant of the gradient, µ is the
constant of strongly convexity, B is the batch size, n is the number of
clients andm is the size of local datasets.
Remark 1. From Theorem 5.9, we can observe that the convergence
error bound consists of five terms. The first term is the convergence
error brought by gradient descent that goes to zero as K increases. The
second term H (nr − 1) results from the client selection, and H (nr − 1)
goes to zero when r = n, i.e., when all clients are selected to join at each
round. The third term C is the constant. These terms are independent
of our proposed sparsified privacy masking technique and hence can
be viewed as a constant.
The fourth term O(1 − p) denotes the error resulting from the
random sparsification operation, where p is the probability of the
sparsifier. We rewrite this term as follows:
O(1 − p) = η
2τG
2rB
[
( 1
p
+ 1) 1
2p2 − 1 + 4L
(
1
p
− 1 + 1
p2(2p2 − 1)
)]
,
where we can see that the errorO would decrease as p increases, which
matches our intution.
The fifth termQ(p,σ 2) is the error from the Gaussian noise. Accord-
ing to Theorem 5.3, we show the relationship between the convergence
error and the privacy guarantee as follows:
Q(p, ϵ) = 2τG
2∑T−1
t=0 |Ci,t |
nB2ρ(ϵ) (2p +
2
p
+
1
L
).
where ρ(ϵ) satisfies ρ(ϵ) = (√1 + ϵ log(1/δ ) − 1)2 log(1/δ ). Due to
the Binomial distribution of the sparsifier, we use d×p to approximate
the value of |Ci,t |, then we have
Q(p, ϵ) = 2KG
2d
nB2(√1 + ϵ log(1/δ ) − 1)2 log(1/δ ) (2p2 + pL + 2).
From the above equation, we can see that the privacy error increases
as the privacy budget ϵ decreases, but it will decrease if the sparsifi-
cation probability p decreases. To achieve the same privacy error Q ,
smaller p allows the client to choose smaller ϵ , and hence the client
obtains a higher privacy guarantee. This demonstrates the ability of
the sparsifier in amplifying the privacy guarantee of CPFed.
5.2.2 Convergence Result: Non-convex Loss. This subsection de-
scribes the convergence rate of CPFed for smooth and non-convex
loss functions.
ConvergenceCriteria. In the error-convergence analysis, since
the objective function is non-convex, we use the expected gradient
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norm as an indicator of convergence, i.e., after K iterations the
algorithm achieves an expected κ-suboptimal solution if:
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
∥∇f (θˆk+1)∥2
]
≤ κ, (20)
where κ is an arbitrarily small value. This condition guarantees the
convergences of the algorithm to a stationary point.
Theorem 5.10 (Non-convex Loss). For the CPFed algorithm,
suppose the total number of iterations K = Tτ whereT is the number
of communication round and τ is the round length. Under Assumptions
1-3, assume all clients are initialized at the same point θ0 ∈ Rd . Then
after K iterations, the expected optimality gap is bounded as follows:
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
∥∇f (θˆk+1)∥2
]
≤ 2
(
f (θ0) − f ∗)
ηK
+ H ′(n
r
− 1) +C ′
+O ′(1 − p) +Q ′(p,σ 2), (21)
whereH ′(nr −1) = ( 2τ
2η2GL2
2m(n−1) +
2ηLω
2n )(nr −1)+ ηLGmn ( 2nr −1),O ′(1−
p) = ητG(p+1)r Bp(2p2−1) +
4ητ LG(1−p)
r Bp +
4ητ LG
rB
1
p2(2p2−1) , and Q
′(p,σ 2) =
2dσ 2τ
ηr (2p + 2p + 1L ). The constant C ′ represents the constant error
bound, i.e.,C ′ = 2τ
2η2GL2
2m(n−1)B +
ηLω
n +
2(2−η2L)G
ητnm . Here,G is the variance
bound of coordinate-wise stochastic gradients, σ 2 is the variance of
Gaussian noise, L is the Lipschitz constant of the gradient, B is the
batch size, n is the number of clients, andm is the size of local datasets.
Remark 2. There are also five terms in the convergence error bound
in (21). The first term is the general convergence error due to gradient
descent that goes to zero as K increases. The second term H ′(nr − 1)
results from the random client selection procedure, and H ′(nr − 1)
goes to zero when r = n, i.e., when all clients are selected to perform
computation at each round. C ′ represent the constant error bound.
The fourth term O ′(1 − p) denotes the error resulting from the
sparsification operation. We rewrite this term as follows:
O ′(1 − p) = ητG
rB
[
( 1
p
+ 1) 1
2p2 − 1 + 4L
(
1
p
− 1 + 1
p2(2p2 − 1)
)]
,
where we can see that O ′ decreases as p increases, which matches the
intuition of random sparsification.
The fifth term Q ′(p,σ 2) is the error incurred from the Gaussian
noise. According to Theorem 5.3, we connect the convergence error
and the privacy guarantee as follows:
Q ′(p, ϵ) = 4τG
2∑T−1
t=0 |Ci,t |
ηnB2ρ(ϵ) (2p +
2
p
+
1
L
).
where ρ(ϵ) satisfies ρ(ϵ) = (√1 + ϵ log(1/δ ) − 1)2 log(1/δ ). Due to
the Binomial distribution of the sparsifier, we can also use d × p to
approximate the value of |Ci,t |, then we have
Q ′(p, ϵ) = 4KG
2d
ηnB2(√1 + ϵ log(1/δ ) − 1)2 log(1/δ ) (2p2 + pL + 2).
From the above equation, we can see that the privacy error increases as
the privacy budget ϵ decreases, but decreases when the sparsification
probability p decreases. Therefore, to achieve the same privacy error
Q ′, smaller p allows the client to choose smaller ϵ , and hence the client
obtains a higher privacy guarantee. This demonstrates the ability of
the sparsifier in amplifying the privacy guarantee of CPFed.
5.3 Training Accuracy and Privacy Trade-off
According to the above end-to-end privacy loss and convergence
error bound of CPFed, we derive the trade-off between accuracy and
privacy of CPFed in this subsection. Specifically, for the convex case,
we obtain Theorem 5.11. From the results, we can see that larger
privacy budget ϵ always leads to faster convergence. However,
the more sparsification, i.e., larger p, does not always leads to a
faster convergence, and the optimal choice of p has to balance the
sparsification error and the privacy error.
Theorem 5.11 (Accuracy-Privacy Trade-off for
Convex Cases). Under Assumptions 1-4, let σ 2 =
2prτGK/nB2(√1 + ϵ log(1/δ ) − 1)2 log(1/δ ) and η = c/√K ,
where c is a constant. If K = n2m4ϵ/log(1/δ ), the convergence rate
of CPFed is
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
f (θˆk+1) − f ∗
]
≤ O
(
pdG2
√
log(1/δ )
nm2
√
ϵ
)
+ O
(
G log(1/δ )
pn2m4ϵ
)
.
(22)
For the non-convex case, the accuracy-privacy trade-off is given
in Theorem 5.12. From the results, we can see that large privacy
budget leads to faster convergence, and there exists an optimal
value of p that optimizes the convergence rate.
Theorem 5.12 (Accuracy-Privacy Trade-off for
Non-convex Cases). Under Assumptions 1-3, let σ 2 =
2prτGK/nB2(√1 + ϵ log(1/δ ) − 1)2 log(1/δ ) and η = c/√K ,
where c is a constant. If K = n2m4ϵ/log(1/δ ), the convergence rate
of CPFed is
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
∥∇f (θˆk+1)∥2
]
≤ O
((
pdG +
1
p
)
G
√
log(1/δ )
nm2
√
ϵ
)
. (23)
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme
CPFed. We first describe our experimental setup and then show
the convergence properties of CPFed. Next, we demonstrate the
communication efficiency of CPFed by comparing it with a baseline
approach. Finally, we show the trade-off between privacy andmodel
accuracy in CPFed and how the sparsified privacy-masking achieve
communication efficiency and privacy protection simultaneously.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets and Learning Tasks.We explore the benchmark dataset
Adult[5] using both logistic regression and neural network mod-
els in our experiments. The Adult dataset contains 48,842 samples
with 14 numerical and categorical features, with each sample corre-
sponding to a person. The task is to predict if the person’s income
exceeds $50, 000 based on the 14 attributes, namely, age, workclass,
fnlwgt, education, education-num, marital-status, occupation, rela-
tionship, race, sex, capital-gain, capital-loss, hours-per-week, and
native-country. To simulate a distributed setting based on the Adult
dataset, we evenly assign the original Adult data to 16 devices such
that each device contains 3,052 data samples. We train a logistic
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Figure 3: Training loss of our scheme in comparison with FedAvg in a convex setting (logistic regression).
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Figure 4: Training loss of our scheme in comparison with FedAvg in a non-convex setting (neural network).
regression classifier and a 3-layer multilayer perceptron classifier
(using ReLU activation function) on the 16 devices with just the
categorical features and use the softmax cross-entropy as the loss
function.
Baseline. We select the state-of-the-art federated learning al-
gorithm called FedAvg [25] as a strong baseline to evaluate the
efficiency of our proposed scheme. In FedAvg, each client performs
τ iterations of SGD and then uploads θ t,τi − θ t to the server with-
out compression. Note that DP protection is not considered in the
original FedAvg scheme. To have a fair comparison, we let each
client in FedAvg add the same Gaussian noise N(0,σ 21d ) to its
local updates before sending them out, similar as [26].
Experimental Settings. We take 80% of the data on each de-
vice for training, 10% for testing and 10% for validation. We tune
the hyperparameters on the validation set and report the average
accuracy on the testing sets of all devices. For all experiments, we
set the privacy failure probability δ = 10−4 and the number of
selected clients in each round r = 4. For the logistic regression, we
set τ = 5 and T = 55. For the multilayer perceptron, we set τ = 10
andT = 50. Due to the randomized nature of our scheme, we repeat
all the experiments for 5 times and report the average results.
6.2 Communication Efficiency of CPFed
We first show the communication efficiency of CPFed in compar-
ison with FedAvg. We consider 3 different sparsification settings
of CPFed where p = 0.1, 0.4 and 0.8, respectively. Note that there
exist complicated trade-offs among communication cost, privacy,
and learning accuracy in CPFed. To show the communication ef-
ficiency of our proposed scheme clearly, we let all of the trained
models provide the same (10, 10−4)-DP guarantee and compare the
trade-offs between communication cost and learning performance
of different schemes.
In Figure 3, we show the results of training loss with respect
to the communication round (left figure) and the total number of
non-zero digits transmitted to the server (right figure), respectively
in logistic regression (LR). Here, larger p implies lower level of
sparsification, which generally leads to higher communication cost
(measured by the numbers of transmitted non-zero digits) in each
round. From the results, we can see that when p is relatively large,
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e.g., p = 0.8, the training loss of CPFed decreases faster than that
of FedAvg in each round. It is because that sparsification can help
reduce the privacy loss according to Theorem 5.3. Given the same
level of DP guarantee, CPFed adds less noise in each communication
round and hence achieves better convergence result than FedAvg.
However, when p becomes rather small, e.g., p = 0.1, the loss of
CPFed decreases slowly and would converge to a high loss value
since the sparsification in CPFed incurs too much error in each
communication round, which dominates the error introduced by
DP noise.
On the other hand, for the training loss v.s. the number of non-
zero transmitted digits, we can observe that CPFed always outper-
forms FedAvg in terms of communication efficiency (defined here
as the number of non-zero transmitted digits or communication
cost needed to achieve a certain learning performance level). Specif-
ically, given any level of training loss, CPFed can always achieve
it with fewer non-zero digits communicated by choosing an ap-
propriate value of p. This is due to the use of sparsified privacy
masking in CPFed. Therefore, CPFed can achieve a better trade-off
between learning performance and communication cost than Fe-
dAvg. In Figure 4, we can observe similar results for non-convex
neural network (NN) models. Once again, decreasing p would lead
to lower communication cost in each round, but the learning per-
formance will only converge to a higher loss value when p becomes
too small. Therefore, the choice of p would need to balance the
trade-off between communication cost and learning performance.
Table 1: Training loss under different communication costs.
S denotes the log2 of the number of non-zero digits transmit-
ted to the server.
S = 3.0 S = 3.5 S = 4.0 S = 4.5
p = 0.1 10.67 10.43 10.43 10.43
LR p = 0.4 10.95 10.26 9.51 9.26
p = 0.8 11.27 10.92 9.74 9.28
p = 0.1 10.24 9.01 8.15 8.13
NN p = 0.4 10.89 10.23 8.47 7.30
p = 0.8 - 10.89 9.69 8.12
In Table 1, we show the optimal p in CPFed to maximize the
communication efficiency by comparing the training loss achieved
under different communication cost for both LR and NN models.
We also highlight the lowest training loss under a certain communi-
cation cost. We can see that the best p to minimize the training loss
varies according to the communication cost budget in CPFed. In
general, when communication cost budget is small, we will choose
a small value of p so that we can perform a reasonable number of
communication rounds to lower the loss. As the communication
cost budget increases, we will choose a larger value of p so that less
noise is added due to sparsification in each round until the noise
introduced due to DP begins to dominate, at which time increasing
p further may damage the privacy benefits of sparisification.
6.3 Trade-off between Accuracy and Privacy
In this subsection, we show the trade-off between privacy and accu-
racy of CPFed in comparison with that of FedAvg. Specifically, we
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Figure 5: Trade-off between privacy and accuracy (logistic
regression).
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network).
show the trade-off between testing accuracy and privacy budget
under different sparsification settings while fixing the communica-
tion cost. We show the results of LR and NNmodels in Figure. 5 and
Figure. 6, respectively. As expected, for both CPFed and FedAvg,
a larger ϵ value (i.e., less privacy guarantee) results in a higher
accuracy. Under any privacy budget, we can always find a CPFed
model that achieves higher testing accuracy than FedAvg while
having lower communication cost. For instance, in Figure 5, when
ϵ = 1, CPFed with p = 0.1 achieves a much higher testing accuracy
than FedAvg while transmitting only 10 times fewer number of
non-zero digits in LR. This is due to the proposed sparsified privacy
masking technique which improves both communication efficiency
and privacy simultaneously. As ϵ increases, the accuracy of CPFed
with p = 0.1 does not increase much due to the large error brought
by the high sparsification However, almost all other CPFed models
can achieve higher testing accuracy than FedAvg. In Figure 6, we
can also observe similar results for NN. An outlier is that when
p = 0.1, CPFed always underperforms FedAvg. This is due to the
fact that the negative impact of high sparsification on the model
accuracy in NN is much more severe than that in LR.
XXX ’20, XXX, XXX Rui Hu, Yanmin Gong, and Yuanxiong Guo
Table 2: Testing accuracy of models trained with different
privacy budgets.
ϵ = 2 ϵ = 4 ϵ = 6 ϵ = 8 ϵ = 10
p = 0.1 0.6585 0.6600 0.6636 0.6693 0.6741
LR p = 0.2 0.4978 0.6695 0.7164 0.7340 0.7455
p = 0.4 0.5888 0.6277 0.6909 0.7301 0.7494
p = 0.8 0.5353 0.6025 0.6585 0.7020 0.7325
p = 0.1 0.2734 0.4899 0.6411 0.7020 0.7629
NN p = 0.2 0.7074 0.7576 0.7656 0.7745 0.7874
p = 0.4 0.6474 0.7125 0.7680 0.7840 0.7878
p = 0.8 0.5693 0.6882 0.7542 0.7658 0.7791
In Table 2, we show the optimal p in CPFed to maximize the
model accuracy by comparing the testing accuracy achieved under
different privacy budgets for both LR and NN models. We can see
that the optimalp to maximize the testing accuracy varies according
to the privacy budget in CPFed. In general, when the privacy budget
is small, the noise introduced by the DP guarantee dominates the
error and we will choose a small value of p so that less DP noise is
added in each round to improve the model accuracy. As the privacy
budget increases, the noise introduced by sparsification begins to
dominate the error, and we will chose a large value of p so as to
reduce the error introduced by sparsification. This matches the
results given in Theorems 5.11 and 5.12. Considering the results in
Table 1 and Table 2 together, we can see that in practice we need
to jointly consider the communication cost and privacy budgets to
find the optimal p in CPFed, which constitutes our future work.
7 RELATEDWORK
Distributed machine learning based on (stochastic) gradient de-
scent has been well studied in the literature with both theoretical
convergence analysis [8, 22, 30] and real-world experiments [12].
However, traditional distributed learning algorithms do not fit into
federated learning wherein the communication cost is usually high.
Recent studies have started to reduce the communication cost in
distributed learning [3, 4, 18, 36–39], which could be divided into
two categories. The first category is to reduce the size of messages
transmitted between the device and server per communication
round by compression, e.g., quantizing and/or sparsifying gradients
computed by each device before aggregation [3, 4, 37]. The second
category is to reduce the number of communication rounds by tech-
niques such as periodic averaging that pay more local computation
for less communication [18, 36, 38, 39] and adaptive aggregation
where devices selectively upload their messages[10, 34]. However,
most of the above communication-efficient schemes ignore the
privacy aspect.
Besides, privacy issue has received significant attention recently
in distributed learning scenarios handling user-generated data.
Among distributed learning schemes that preserve privacy, many
of them rely on secure multi-party computation or homomorphic
encryption, which involve both high computation and communi-
cation overhead and are only applicable to simple learning tasks
such as linear regression[28] and logistic regression[27]. Further-
more, these privacy-preserving solutions could not prevent the
information leakage from the final learned model. DP has become
the de-facto standard for privacy notion and is being increasingly
adopted in private data analysis [13]. A wide range of differen-
tially private distributed learning algorithms (see [1, 17, 19, 20]
and references therein) have been proposed based on different opti-
mization methods (e.g., alternating direction method of multipliers,
gradient descent, and distributed consensus) and noise addition
mechanisms (e.g., output perturbation, objective perturbation, and
gradient perturbation). However, most of them do not consider the
communication efficiency aspect and therefore are not suitable for
federated learning. Moreover, few of them could provide a rigorous
performance guarantee without much accuracy degradation of the
final learned model.
A few very recent works [2, 23, 26] have started to consider
both the communication and privacy aspects in general distributed
learning setting. Specifically, Agarwal et al. [2] proposed a modified
distributed SGD scheme called cpSGD based on gradient quanti-
zation and binomial mechanism to make the scheme both private
and communication-efficient. However, the authors treat these as
separate issues, and develop different approaches to address each
within cpSGD. Li et al. [23] developed a method that compresses
the transmitted messages via sketches to simultaneously achieve
communication efficiency and DP in distributed learning. Our work
is orthogonal to theirs by focusing on reducing the size of mes-
sages transmitted per round using sparsification. McMahan et al.
[26] designed an approach to reduce the number of communica-
tion rounds while preserving DP in federated learning. However,
their approach assumes a fully trusted server and does not provide
any rigorous performance guarantee. In comparison, our proposed
CPFed scheme achieves high communication efficiency and model
accuracywhile preserving local DPwithout assuming a fully trusted
server. Furthermore, our proposed scheme has a rigorous perfor-
mance guarantee. Zhang et al.[42] focus on the distributed learning
over networks and rely on decentralized SGD, which is not suitable
for the federated learning setting.
8 CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on communication efficient and privacy preserv-
ing federated learning. We have proposed CPFed, a new federated
learning scheme based on sparsified privacy masking. CPFed can
improve both communication efficiency and privacy guarantee at
the same time. We have provided rigorous convergence and pri-
vacy analyses of CPFed under both convex and non-convex model
settings and derived an explicit trade-off between training accuracy
and privacy guarantee. Extensive experiments based on the real-
world datasets have been conducted to verify the effectiveness of
the proposed scheme and numerically show the inherent trade-off
among communication cost, privacy guarantee, and training accu-
racy. For future work, we plan to investigate the optimal algorithmic
configurations of CPFed under limited privacy and communication
cost budgets and the interplay of privacy protection with other data
compression techniques.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
Proof. It is easy to verify that the expectation of [Sp (y)]j is yi ,
and hence we have E[Sp (y)] = y. Then, given that Var[Sp (y)] =∑d
j=1 p(yj/p − yj )2 + (1 − p)(−yj )2 = (1/p − 1)∥y∥2, Lemma 4.2
follows. □
B PROOF OF LEMMA 5.4
Proof. According to the definition of θˆk , we have
EΩk [θˆk ] =
1
r
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ωk |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)
∑
i ∈Ωk
θki =
1
n
n∑
i=1
θki .
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Let θ¯k = 1n
∑n
i=1 θ
k
i represents the expectation of θˆ
k . The vari-
ance of θˆk is
Var[θˆk ] = 1
r2
EΩk
 n∑
i=1
1{i ∈ Ωk }(θki − θ¯k )
2
=
1
r2
[
n∑
i=1
P(i ∈ Ωk )∥θki − θ¯k ∥2
+
∑
i,j
P(i, j ∈ Ωk )⟨θki − θ¯k ,θkj − θ¯k ⟩].
By using that
∑n
i=1 ∥θki − θ¯k ∥2 +
∑
i,j ⟨θki − θ¯k ,θkj − θ¯k ⟩ = 0, we
have
Var[θˆk ] = 1
nr
n∑
i=1
∥θki − θ¯k ∥2 +
r − 1
rn(n − 1)
∑
i,j
⟨θki − θ¯k ,θkj − θ¯k ⟩
=
1
r (n − 1)
(
1 − r
n
) n∑
i=1
∥θki − θ¯k ∥2.
Finally, Lemma 5.4 follows by using Lemma 5.7. □
C PROOF OF LEMMA 5.5
Proof. The randomness of дˆk comes from the random sam-
pling of datapoints and the client selection, so in the following
we compute the expectation and variance of дˆk over Ωk and ξki .
According to the unbiasedness of the client selection scheme and
Assumption 2,
E[дˆk ] = 1
r
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ω |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)Eξ ki

∑
i ∈Ωk
∇fi (θki , ξki )

=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki ).
Next, we bound the variance of дˆk using its expectation. Given that
Var[дˆk ] = E
1r ∑i ∈Ωk ∇fi (θki , ξki ) − 1n
n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki )

2
= E
1
r2
 ∑i ∈Ωk ∇fi (θki , ξki ) − ∇fi (θki )

2
︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
A0
+ E
1r ∑i ∈Ωk ∇fi (θki ) − 1n
n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki )

2
︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
A1
. (24)
Based on the unbiasedness of the client selection scheme, we have
that
A0 =
1
r2
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ω |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)
∑
i ∈Ωk
∇fi (θki , ξki ) − ∇fi (θki )2
≤ ω
r
,
where we use the fact that Var(∑ni=1 Xi ) = ∑ni=1 Var(Xi ) for inde-
pendent random variables and Assumption 2. For the second term
A1, we have
A1 = 2
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ω |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)
(
1
r
− 1
n
)2 ∑
i ∈Ωk
∇fi (θki )2
+ 2
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ω |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)
1
n2
∑
i<Ωk
∇fi (θki )2
=
2(n − r )2
(rn)2
1(n
r
) (n − 1
r − 1
) n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki )2
+
2
n2
1(n
r
) ((n
r
)
−
(
n − 1
r − 1
)) n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki )2
≤ 2G
m
(
1
r
− 1
n
)
.
The first inequality uses the fact that Var(∑ni=1 Xi ) = ∑ni=1 Var(Xi )
for independent random variables. The last inequality is based on
Assumption 3. Lemma 5.5 follows by plugging the upper bound of
A0 and A1 back to eqn. (24). □
D PROOF OF LEMMA 5.6
Proof. Since the randomness of bˆk comes from the Gaussian
noise and the client selection, we compute the expectation of ∥bˆk ∥2
over {bki }n1 and Ωk . Due to the independence of Ωk , bk1 , . . . , bkn , we
have
E∥bˆk ∥2 = 1
r2
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ω |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)Ebki
 ∑i ∈Ωk bki

2
=
1
r2
∑
Ω∈[n],
|Ω |=r
P(Ωk = Ω)
∑
i ∈Ωk
Ebki
∥bki ∥2
=
dσ 2
r
,
where we use Var(∑ni=1 Xi ) = ∑ni=1 Var(Xi ) for independent ran-
dom variables and E∥bki ∥2 = E∥bki −E[bki ]∥2+ ∥E[bki ]∥2 = σ 2. □
E PROOF OF LEMMA 5.7
Proof. Given k + 1 mod τ = 0, we known that the time k0 =
k − τ + 1 is the communication time, which implies {θk0i }ni=1 is
identical. Then
1
n
n∑
i=1
∥θ¯k − θki ∥2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∥(θki − θ¯k0 ) − (θ¯k − θ¯k0 )∥2
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∥θki − θ¯k0 ∥2 − ∥θ¯k − θ¯k0 ∥2
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
∥θki − θ¯k0 ∥2. (25)
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According to the update rule of each client, we have
∥θki − θ¯k0 ∥2 ≤ τ
k∑
s=k0
E∥η∇fi (θsi , ξ si )∥2 ≤ τ 2η2G/B. (26)
Lemma 5.7 follows by combining the inequalities (26) and (25). □
F PROOF OF LEMMA 5.8
Proof. When k+1 mod τ = 0, by the property of the sparsifier,
we have that
E∥rˆk+1∥2 = 1
r2
∑
i ∈Ωk
E
∆˜ki − pSp (∆˜ki )2
≤ 1
r2
∑
i ∈Ωk
2p2( 1
p
− 1)∥∆˜ki ∥2 + 2(1 − p)2∥∆˜ki ∥2
=
2(1 − p)
r2
∑
i ∈Ωk
∥∆˜ki − bki ∥2︸        ︷︷        ︸
A0
+
2d(1 − p)σ 2
r
where we use the fact that Var[X ] = E(X − E[X ]])2 and
Var(∑ni=1 Xi ) = ∑ni=1 Var(Xi ) for independent random variables.
Using the fact that ∥a +b∥2 ≤ (1 +γ )∥a∥2 + (1 +γ−1)∥b∥2 for any
γ > 0, we have
A0 = (1 + γ )∥rk0i ∥2 + (1 + γ−1)η2∥
τ−1∑
s=0
∇fi (θk0+si , ξk0+si )∥2
≤ (1 + γ )∥rk0i ∥2 + (1 + γ−1)η2τ 2G/B.
Using the fact that r0i = 0d , we can see that the the memory is
bounded by
E∥rˆk+1∥2 = (1 + γ−1)η
2τ 2G
rB
(k+1)/τ∑
t=0
(2(1 − p)(1 + γ ))t + 2d(1 − p)σ
2
rB
≤ η
2τ 2G
rB
(
1 + 1
p
)
1
2p2 − 1 +
2d(1 − p)σ 2
r
where the first inequality assumes γ = p. □
G PROOF OF THEOREM 5.9
Proof. By the L-smoothness of f , we have
f (θˆk+1) ≤ f (θˆk )+ ⟨∇f (θk ), θˆk+1 − θˆk ⟩︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
A0
+
L
2 ∥θˆ
k+1 − θˆk ∥2︸           ︷︷           ︸
A1
. (27)
When k + 1 mod τ = 0, we have
θˆk+1 − θˆk = θˆk0 + Sp (θˆk − ηдˆk − θˆk0 + rˆk + bˆk ) − θˆk .
Due to the properties of the sparsifier and stochastic gradient, we
can obtain that
E[θˆk+1 − θˆk ] = −η
n
n∑
i=1
∇fi (θki ) + E[rˆk ].
Then, we have the expectation of A0, i.e.,
E[A0] = −η
n
n∑
i=1
⟨∇fi (θˆk ),∇fi (θki )⟩ + ⟨∇f (θk ),E[rˆk ]⟩
=
1 − η
2 ∥∇f (θˆ
k )∥2 − η2n
n∑
i=1
∥∇fi (θki )∥2 +
1
2E∥rˆ
k ∥2
+
η
2n
n∑
i=1
∥∇fi (θˆk ) − ∇fi (θki )∥2 −
1
2E∥∇f (θˆ
k ) − rˆk ∥2
≤ ηL
2
2n
n∑
i=1
∥θˆk − θki ∥2 +
(1 − η)
2 ∥∇f (θˆ
k )∥2 + 12E∥rˆ
k ∥2,
where we use the smoothness of fi and the fact that ∥ · ∥2 > 0.
Then, given that
∥θˆk − θki ∥2 = ∥θˆk − θ¯k ∥2 + ∥θ¯k − θki ∥2,
we can bound E[A0] by Lemma 5.4 and 5.7, i.e.,
E[A0] ≤ −η2 ∥∇f (θˆ
k )∥2+τ
2η3GL2
2
(
n
r (n − 1)m −
1
m(n − 1) +
1
B
)
+
G
2nm +
η2τ 2G
2rB
(
1 + 1
p
)
1
2p2 − 1 +
2dσ 2
r
. (28)
Next, we bound the expectation of A1 by splitting it into two
parts:
E[A1] ≤ 2E∥θˆk − ηдˆk − θˆk0 − Sp (θˆk − ηдˆk − θˆk0 + rˆk + bˆk )∥2︸                                                                  ︷︷                                                                  ︸
B0
+ 2η2E∥дˆk ∥2.
According to the sparsification properties, we get
B0 =
(
1
p
− 1
)
E∥θˆk − ηдˆk − θˆk0 + rˆk ∥2 + E∥rˆk ∥2 + E∥Sp (bˆk )∥2
≤ 2
(
1
p
− 1
)
E∥θˆk − ηдˆk − θˆk0 ∥2 +
(
2
p
− 1
)
E∥rˆk ∥2 + pdσ
2
r
≤ 2 − 2p
p
η2τ
τ−1∑
s=0
E∥дˆk0+s ∥2 + 2η
2τ 2G
rBp2(2p2 − 1) +
dσ 2
r
(
2p + 2
p
)
≤ η
2τ 2G
rB
(
2(1 − p)
p
+
2
p2(2p2 − 1)
)
+
dσ 2
r
(
2p + 2
p
)
)
.
Combining Lemma 5.5 and the bound of B0, one yields
E[A1] = 2η
2τ 2G
rB
(
2(1 − p)
p
+
2
p2(2p2 − 1)
)
+
2dσ 2
r
(
2p + 2
p
)
+
2η2ω
r
+
2η2G
m
(
2
r
− 1
n
)
. (29)
Now, combining eqn.(27), (28) and (29), we obtain that when
k + 1 mod τ = 0,
E[f (θˆk+1) − f (θˆk )] ≤ −η2 ∥∇f (θˆ
k )∥2 + R0, (30)
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with
R0 =
τ 2η3GL2
2
(
1
m(n − 1) (
n
r
− 1) + 1
B
)
+
(1 − 2η2L)G
2nm +
η2Lω
2r
+
η2τ 2G(p + 1)
2rBp(2p2 − 1) +
2η2τ 2LG((p − p2)(2p2 − 1) + 1)
rBp2(2p2 − 1)
+
η2LG
rm
+
dσ 2
r
(
2p + 2
p
+
1
L
)
When k + 1 mod τ , 0, there has no error from rˆk , Sp (·) and bˆk ,
then we have
E[f (θˆk+1) − f (θˆk )] ≤ −η2 ∥∇f (θˆ
k )∥2 + R1, (31)
with
R1 =
τ 2η3GL2
2
(
1
m(n − 1)
(n
r
− 1
)
+
1
B
)
+
η2Lω
2r +
η2LG
2m
(
2
r
− 1
n
)
.
By the µ-strongly convexity of f (·), we have
E[f (θˆk+1) − f ∗] ≤ (1 − µη)[f (θˆk ) − f ∗] + R, (32)
where R = R0 if k + 1 mod τ = 0, and R = R1 otherwise. Then,
taking the total expectation and averaging over K iterations of
eqn.(32), we can obtain
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
f (θˆk+1) − f ∗
]
≤ 1 − ηµ
Kηµ
(
f (θ0) − f ∗
)
+
1
τ
(R0 − R1) + R1.
Then Theorem 5.9 follows by some rearrangements. □
H PROOF OF THEOREM 5.10
Proof. According to the results of one step SGD given in
eqn. (30) and (31), we have
∥∇f (θˆk )∥2 ≤ 2
η
E[f (θˆk+1) − f (θˆk )] + 2
η
R,
where R = R0 if k + 1 mod τ = 0, and R = R1 otherwise. Taking a
telescopic sum from k = 0 to k = K − 1, we get
E
[
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
∥∇f (θˆk )∥2
]
≤ 2
(
f (θ0) − f ∗)
ηK
+
2
ητ
(R1−R0)+ 2
η
R1.
Theorem 5.10 follows by rearranging the above inequality. □
